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A TREND TOWARD COALESCENCE OF
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE:
,REMEDY FOR INVASION OF PARTICULATES
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The possessor of land has always enjoyed a favored legal position
against those whose encroachments threatened his possessory inter-
ests.1 All unprivileged physical intrusions of a direct nature consti-
tuted trespass 2 and have been remedied without a showing of actual
harm4--indeed even though the entry was designed to benefit the
possessor.' On the other hand, if the entry could be more properly
termed "indirect," either an intentional or negligent entry had to be
proved along with actual damages. 5 Although force was said to be a
necessary ingredient,6 it was always implied in trespass actions in
the absence of actual violence." In those situations in which the entry
did not meet the requirements of directness, the appropriate remedy
was trespass on the case.$
The interest of the possessor in the use and enjoyment of his land
has also been protected-though less fully-by an action on the case,
this time for nuisance.9 This latter action bears some resemblance to
trespass in that it was available without a showing of negligence or
intentional misconduct" as that term is usually understood :11 but it
resembles the strict action of trespass on the case since it required a
1. 1 Harper & James, Torts § 1.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper &
James].
2. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 370 (1835); 1 Harper & James § 1.5, at 16;
Prosser, Torts § 13, at 56 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
3. l'Harper & James § 1.3, at 11; Prosser § 13, at 56.
4. Case of the Tithes, Y.B. 21 Hen.VII 27, pl. 5 (1507); See also 1 Harper &
James § 1.5, at 16, § 1.8, at 25.
5. Reynolds v. Clarke, I Str. 634, 93 Eng. Rep. 747 (K.B. 1725); Prosser § 13,
at 56.
6. 1 Harper & James § 1.3, at 9; Prosser § 7, at 26.
7. 1 Harper & James § 1.3, at 9 & n.13; Prosser § 13, at 56; Shipman, Com-
mon-Law Pleading § 35 (3d ed. 1923).
8. Reynolds v. Clarke, 1 Str. 634, 93 Eng. Rep. 747 (K.B. 1725); 1 Harper &
James § 1.3, at 9.
9. This statement is based primarily on the analysis given in 1 Street, Foun-
dations of Legal Liability ch. 15 (1906). See also 1 Harper & James § 1.1, § 1.24,
at 67; 2 Harper & James § 12.3, at 749; Prosser § 70, at 390.
10. 1 Harper & James § 1.24, at 68-69; Prosser § 70, at 392.
11. Prosser § 8, at 29; Restatement, Torts § 13, Comment e (1934). See Miller,
A Primer of Absolute Liability, 1957 Wash. U.L.Q. 99.
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showing of actual damages.' 2 In their developmental stages, the ac-
tions designed to protect the physical integrity of the land-trespass
and trespass on the case-on the one hand, and the action designed to
protect the possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land on
the other, were theoretically mutually exclusive.1
More recent authorities suggest that substantial changes have
taken place in these actions," particularly in the recognition that
there can be no liability in any of them unless the defendant's con-
duct was either intentional, negligent, or ultrahazardous.' 5 Early
cases and authorities indicate that nuisance constituted a basis for
liability in tort independent of intentionality, negligence or ultra-
hazardousness ;, but modern authorities disclose the fallacy in this
assertion-nuisance is not a type of conduct, but only an effect, an
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. I
Recognizing that considerable disagreement remains concerning the
precise scope of trespass and nuisance28 the Restatement of Torts'
definitions are presented to facilitate analysis and comparison.
12. Thompson v. Crocker, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 59 (1829); 1 Harper & James
§ 1.23, at 67.
13. In general, it is said that trespass on the one hand, and the case actions on
the other, were in origin theoretically mutually exclusive. See Keigwin, Cases in
Common Law Actions § 62, at 163 (2d ed. 1938). See also Prosser § 13, at 56, §
72, at 409. The extension stated in the text necessarily follows from Street's
further division of case actions into those whici. were closely allied to trespass
on the one hand and the less clearly related case for nuisance on the other. See
note 9 supra.
14. McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court, said:
There has been forgetfulness at times that the forms of action have
been abolished, and that liability is dependent upon the facts and not upon
the name.... [W]e hold that whenever a nuisance has its origin in neg-
ligence, one may not avert the consequences of his own contributory
negligence by affixing to the negligence of the wrongdoer the label of a
nuisance. Very often the sufferer is at liberty to give to his complaint
either one label or the other. It would be intolerable if the choice of a
name were to condition liability.
Id. at 344, 160 N.E. at 392. See generally Prosser § 56; Ames, Law and Morals,
22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1908); Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested
Changes in Classification, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1917).
15. Restatement, Torts §§ 158, 165 (1934); Restatement, Torts § 822 (1939).
16. Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taun. 29, 128 Eng. Rep. 943 (C.P. 1815) ; Prosser § 70,
at 392; Note, 5 Detroit L. Rev. 84 (1935); Comment, 33 Marq. L. Rev. 240 (1950).
17. Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 698, 283 S.W. 1039
(1926); Schindler v. Standard Oil Co., 207 Mo. App. 190, 232 S.W. 735 (1921);
Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944); Prosser
§ 70, at 391.
18. 1 Harper & James § 1.23; Prosser § 72, at 409.
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Under the Restatement, one intentionally entering land in another's
possession or causing some person or thing to enter thereon, is liable
as a trespasser even in the absence of harm," while one entering
recklessly, negligently or as a result of ultrahazardous activity is
liable only if harm results.20 Nuisance liability obtains if there is a
substantial and unreasonable invasion which is intentional, negligent,
reckless, or ultrahazardous.21
Several basic distinctions immediately become apparent in the case
of intentional invasions. For trespass there need be only an unprivi-
leged trespassory entry whereas an actionable nuisance requires a
substantial and unreasonable interference of a non-trespassory nature.
For this reason the phrase de minimis non curat lex is often applied to
nuisance,22 and various policy considerations are invoked to avoid
liability where the utility of defendant's conduct outweighs plaintiff's
interest in use and enjoyment.23 "[T]he injurious activity must ad-
vance .the social interests of the community more than such interests
19. Restatement, Torts § 158 (1934):
One who intentionally and without a consensual or other privilege
(a) enters land in possession of another or any part thereof or causes
a thing or third person so to do, or
(b) remains thereon, or
(c) permits to remain thereon a thing which the actor or his precedessor
in legal interest brought thereon...
is -liable as a trespasser to the other irrespective of whether harm is
thereby caused to any of his legally protected interests.
20. Id. at § 165:
One who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an extra hazardous
activity, enters land in the possession of another or causes a thing or
third person so to enter is subject to liability to the possessor if, but only
if, his presence or the presence of the thing or the third person upon the
land causes harm to the land, to the possessor thereof or to a thing or a
third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected
interest.
21. Restatement, Torts § 822 (1939):
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use
or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules govern-
ing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
22. Prosser § 70, at 395.
23. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 50 N.E.2d 517 (1944);
Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T. Ry., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893); Waschak v.
Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Restatement, Torts § 826 (1939).
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are impaired by its interference with the property rights of the
plaintiff,"24 and the actor must have made a reasonable effort to
mitigate the injurious effects of the activity. 5 This "weighing"
process is, however, foreign to the law of trespass. 6 Thus it may be
seen that the remedy for intentional interferences with possessory
rights is more comprehensive than that for intentional interferences
with use and enjoyment since, once the trepassory entry has been
established, there is no inquiry into the reasonableness of defendant's
conduct and there need be no showing of damages.
II. ENTRY CAPABILITIES OF TANGIBLE AS OPPOSED
TO INTANGIBLE OBJECTS
A trespass is occasioned only through the entry of some person or
thing.27 It is generally assumed that entry must be accomplished by
a tangible object capable of occupying space, thereby depriving the
possessor of his right to exclusive possession.28 Entries accomplished
by fumes,2 soot,3o dust, 1 light rays 32 ashes and sawdust,33 or gases, 3
have been held by the great majority of courts35 to be nuisances-
24. 6A American Law of Property § 28.26 (Casner ed. 1954).
25. DeBlois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930).
26. Prosser § 13, at 62-63.
27. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847
(1948); Prosser § 72, at 409.
28. Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942) ; Amphi-
theaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, supra note 27; Norwood v. Eastern Ore. Land
Co., 130 Ore. 25, 5 P.2d 1057 (1931). See Prosser, § 72; Keeton, Trespass,
Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1959).
29. E.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash.
1954); Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, supra note 28; Morgan v. High Penn Oil
Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109
A.2d 310 (1954); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn.
331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 290. S.W.2d 696
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Vestal, 231 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950); cases collected at 54 A.L.R.2d 764 (1957).
30. E.g., King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); McGee
v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944) ; Burford Oil Co. v. Wadley,
41 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
31. Marvel Wells, Inc. v. Seelig, 115 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 Pac. 813 (1924);
Annot., 3 A.L.R. 312 (1919).
32. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847
(1948).
33. E.g., York v. Stallings, 217 Ore. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959); Bourne v. Wil-
zon-Ca:. Lumber Co., 58 Ore. 48, 113 Pac. 52 (1911).
34. E.g., United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 296 Pac.
262 (1931) ; Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 Pac. 450
(1916); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
35. See notes 27-33 supra.
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normally, without consideration of the trespass possibility. Owners
who have been injured by such particulates must seek their remedy
in nuisance. Still other courts have avoided passing on the entry
capabilities of particulates by holding that the entry was indirect or
consequential 3 6 since intervening forces such as wind or.gravity Are
usually necessary to carry particulates onto plaintiff's land.
One of tie first wedges to be driven into the direct-indirect dicho-
tomy was in the field of vibrations caused by blasting." It is not
always clear, however, whether recovery was permitted because
vibrations constituted a trespass, or because ultrahazardousness was
thought an appropriate basis for liability in nuisance."8 These deci-
sions are based on a common-sense recognition that there is no great
logic in permitting recovery without proof of negligence where
defendant's blasting operations have thrown rock onto plaintiff's
house, and denying recovery without proof of negligence where con-
cussion has succeeded in wreaking an equal amount of havoc. How-
ever, a few courts still regard concussion as indirect or consequential
and require proof of negligence.39 The tenacious clinging of those
courts to basic conceptual distinctions between trespass and nuisance
has been explained as a "marriage of procedural technicality with
scientific, ignorance.'40
36. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954);
O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38 Utah 475, 114 Pac. 127 (1911); Bart-
lett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
37. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931); Britton
v. Harrison Const. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Central Iron & Coal
Co. v. Vanderheuk, 147 Ala. 546, 41 So. 145 (1906); McKenna v. Pacific E. Ry.,
104 Cal. App. 538, 286 Pac. 445 (1930) ; Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co.,
174 Iowa 23, 156 N.W. 188 (1916); Adams & Sullivan v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535,
197 S.W. 974 (1917) ; Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970
(1914); Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting-
The Rule of the Future, I & II, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 667 (1920).
38. Compare Britton v. Harrison Const. Co., supra note 37; Central Iron &
Coal Co. v. Vanderheuk, supra note 37, with Watson v. Mississippi River Power
Co., supra note 37.
39. Bessepner Coal, Iron & Land Co. v. Doak, 152 Ala. 166, 44 So. 627 (1907);
Whitla v. Ippolito, 102 N.J.L. 354, 131 Atl. 873 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926) ; Coley v.
Cohen, 289 N.Y. 365, 45 N.E.2d 913 (1942); Holland House Co. v. Baird, 169 N.Y.
136, 62 N.E. 149 (1901) ; Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Ry., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592
(1893); Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892);
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rainwater, 140 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940). See Campbell v. Adams, 228 Ky. 156, 14 S.W.2d 418 (1929) ; Hickey
v. McCabe, 30 R.I. 346, 75 Atl. 404 (1910); Prosser § 13, at 56.
40. Prosser § 59, at 336.
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Early Exceptions to the Physical Entry Rule in Trespass
Courts have experienced little difficulty in finding a trespass where
a tangible object entered the land, and recovery in trespass has even
been allowed in cases involving objects quite small but not clearly of a
type requiring categorization as a nuisance. Thus, recovery was
allowed in trespass when pellets from defendant's shotgun landed on
plaintiff's property,41 and when spray from a cooling tower on the
roof of defendant's theatre fell on the patio of plaintiff's luncheon-
ette, precluding use of the area as a summer garden.4 2 Indeed, an
early New York case43 permitted recovery in trespass when gas from
defendant's underground main seeped into plaintiff's property and
killed his shade trees.
Thus, with the above exceptions, under the present majority view, if
a plaintiff's interest in use and enjoyment of his land is invaded by the
emission of obnoxious fumes from a neighboring factory, whose owner
realizes that the invasion will necessarily occur, plaintiff can only
recover if the court is convinced that the utility of the defendant's
conduct is outweighed by the plaintiff's interest in use and enjoyment.
On the other hand, if a defendant were to dismantle a factory in a
remote area and intentionally cause some of the bricks to fall upon
unoccupied neighboring land, defendant would be strictly liable for the
invasion even in the absence of actual damage. However, it cannot
be said that defendant was any more at "fault" in the latter situation
than in the former."
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION-THE REYNOLDS METALS CASES
Two recent decisions have pioneered condemnation of artificial dis-
tinctions based on the entry capabilities of various injurious substan-
ces and have indicated that the controlling criterion should not be the
size or mass of the object but rather the force or energy of its entry.
The first of these cases, Fairview Farms Inc. v. Reynolds Metals
41. Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N.W. 295 (1907).
42. B & R Luncheonette, Inc. v. Fairmont Theatre Corp., 278 App. Div. 133,
103 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1951), appeal denied, 100 N.E.2d 194 (1951). Accord, Shella-
barger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905) (banging on tin pans
held trespass); Ingmundson v. Midland Continental R.R., 42 N.D. 455, 173 N.W.
752 (1919) (emission of smoke and cinders from railroad train held trespass).
43. Donohue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N.Y. 313, 73 N.E. 1108 (1905). It should
be noted that in this case the underground entry of gas into plaintiff's property
does not conform to the traditional juridical expectation that gas will cause an
invasion of use and enjoyment as an airborne agent. Moreover, in at least three
of the cases cited in notes 40-42 supra, the invading agent was dangerous in itself,
although, admittedly, the courts attached no independent significance to this.
44. Miller, supra note 11.
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Co.,4 5 arose in a federal district court in Oregon. It involved the
emission from defendant's aluminum reduction plant of invisible
fluoride particles which fell on plaintiff's dairy farm, causing eventual
deterioration of his grazing lands. Plaintiff was eager to persuade
the court that his cause of action lay in trespass, since two-thirds of
the damages46 depended upon application of Oregon's six year statute
of limitation on trespass 4 7 as opposed to the two year nuisance stat-
ute.48 The deposit of the particles on plaintiff's land was held to be a
trespass. Recognizing the historical distinction between trespass and
nuisance, 9 the court indicated that traditionally a direct invasion
"could only be. sustained on a trespass theory if the Court could see
some physical intrusion by tangible matter."50 The court, however,
concluded that three Oregon cases 5' allowing recovery in nuisance
where particulates entered the land were not authority for the proposi-
tion that injurious particulates can never constitute a trespass, since
in each case "the moving party relied solely on the theory of nuisance
... [and] a finding of nuisance does not preclude the existence of a
trespass.$132 The court also distinguished decisions 3 in other states
which held that invading particulates constitute a nuisance:
Many of these cases are distinguishable on the basis that plain-
tiff failed to prove that any solid matter was deposited on his
land, while in others there is no indication that the theory of
trespass was presented to the court. A few cases hold directly
45. 176 F. Supp. 178 .(D. Ore. 1959).
46. The particulates in this case had been deposited on plaintiff's land over a
period of approximately eight years. Thus, under the statute of limitations for
trespass plaintiff could have recovered damages for the six year period immedi-
ately preceeding the bringing of this action, whereas he would have been limited
to two years under the statute for nuisance.
47. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.080 (1959).
48. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 (1959).
49. 176 F. Supp. at 185, quoting from Restatement, Torts, Introductory Note
ch. 40, pp. 218-19 (1939).
The action for private nuisance originated in the assize of nuisance which
dates back to as early as the Twelfth Century. This action was com-
plementary to the assize of novel disseisin. While the assize of novel dis-
seisin was an action for redressing interference with the seisin of land,
the assize of nuisance provided redress where the injury was not a dis-
seisin, as where there was no entry on the plaintiff's land but was an
indirect daniage to the land or an interference with its use and enjoy-
ment. The assize of novel disseisin was directed to secure an undisturbed
possession; the assize of nuisance to secure its free enjoyment.
50. 176 F. Supp. at 185.
51. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847
(1948) ; Lindley v. Hyland, 173 Ore. 93, 144 P.2d 295 (1943) ; Bourne v. Wilson-
Case Lumber Co., 58 Ore. 48, 113 Pae. 52 (-1911).
52. 176 F. Supp. at 185.
53. See cases collected 54 A-L.R.2d 764 (1957).
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contra to the holding of this Court, but a reading of those cases
leaves this Court with the impression that the foreign jurisdic-
tion was looking past the initial question of whether there was
in fact a trespass and was concerned with balancing the equities
to determine the existence or nonexistence of a trespass.5 '
After pointing out that modern science could accurately determine
the fact of the entry of "tangible" or "intangible" matter, the court
concluded that "air-borne liquids and solids deposited upon [plain-
tiff's] lands constituted a trespass."' 5
The second case, Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,56 involved the same
defendant and interference, and was decided contemporaneously with
the Fairview case. Here plaintiff alleged that deposits of flouride com-
pounds on his land rendered it unfit for raising livestock. The Oregon
Supreme Court alluding to modern theories of the identity of mass and
energy, approached the subject more directly, and concluded that any
measurable force, even light, could constitute a trespass. In that case -,
the recovery would be determined by weighing the reasonableness and
amount of interference against plaintiff's interest in exclusive pos-
session.
Initially, like the federal court, the Oregon Supreme Court reasoned
(1) that trespass and nuisance were not mutually exclusive, and that
the same conduct could result in an actionable invasion of both in-
terests, and (2) if the nuisance theory is relied on, a court is not
required to discuss the applicability of the law of trespass to the same
facts. The court refused to follow the traditional visible object re-
quirement, and indicated that such a distinction may have been
justified in the days when men did not understand the forces surround-
ing them, but that "in this atomic age, even the uneducated know the
great and awful force contained in the atom and what it can do to a
man's property if it is released." 57 The court, preferring to empha-
size the object's energy or force rather than its size, ultimately pro-
posed a redefinition of trespass as: "any intrusion which invades the
possessor's protected interest in exclusive possesion, whether that
intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which
can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physi-
cist."5'
Recognizing that such a departure from the traditional definition
without more, would impose an almost intolerable burden upon indus-
54. 176 F. Supp. at 186.
55. Ibid.
56. 342 P.2d 790 (Ore. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
57. 342 P.2d at 793.
53. Id. at 794.
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try, the court imported into the law of trespass *both the de minimis
principle"9 and the weighing process so familiar in the law of nui-
sance. 0
IV. EFFECT OF THE MODIFICATION OF TRESPASS
Importation of Weighing Process and De Minimis
Concept into Trespass
The application of the de minimis concept to trespass would, in
effect, require a showing of substantial damage before it could be said
that any protectible interest of the plaintiff had been violated. The
Oregon court felt that this would be a desirable innovation since,
"Once recognizing that actual damage need not be shown in making
out an actionable invasion, the plaintiff's right to insist upon freedom
from interference with his possession seems almost limitless."1 The
court buttressed its position by pointing out that the absolute remedy
available in trespass came about because of its original criminal
nature and that when the criminal and civil aspects of the action were
separated, the civil action retained the absoluteness of relief found
in the criminal action, and not without good cause, since it was still
a valuable means of preventing breaches of the peace, as trespass
was likely to do in early England.62 Today, however, the rule per-
mitting recovery without a showing of actual damages persists largely
to protect the possessor's proprietary or dignitary interest in the
land.8 s
If, as the Martin case suggests, the test of liability for the invasion
of particles is whether the defendant has invaded any protectible
interest of the plaintiff and this determination is in turn dependent
upon whether the plaintiff has suffered any damage, then how is the
59. Ibid.
In every case in which trespass is alleged the court is presented with a
problem of deciding whether the defendant's intrusion has violated a
legally protected interest of the plaintiff. In most cases the defendant's
conduct so clearly invades the well established possessory interest of the
plaintiff that no discussion of the point is called for. But where neither
the defendant's conduct nor the plaintiff's use fall within the familiar
trespass pattern of the past the courts are faced with a preliminary in-
quiry as to whether the plaintiff has a protectible interest under the law
of trespass. This in turn calls for the inquiry as to whether the defen-
dant's conduct was such as to constitute an invasion of that interest.
60. 342 P.2d at 795. "[T]he tort of trespass involves a weighing process,
similar to that involved in the law of nuisance, although to a more limited extent
than in nuisance and for a different purpose, i.e., in the one case to define the
possessor's interest in exclusive possession, and in the other to define the posses-
sor's interest in use and enjoyment."
61. Id. at 796.
62. Ibid.
63. 342 P.2d at 797.
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possessor of land to protect himself against the ripening of prescrip-
tive rights or settle boundary disputes? The answer would seem to
be that where the defendant's conduct, if uninterrupted, would lead to
the ripening of such rights, it is itself sufficiently damaging to main-
tain the action so as to stop the running of the statute of limitations.
Further, where any measurable particle or force would satisfy
the trespassory entry requirement, the weighing process serves as a
useful limitation upon the unwarranted extension of tort liability.
This is illustrated by the Martin decision's handling of Amphitheaters,
Inc. v. Portland Meadows." The owner of a drive-in movie theatre
contended that he had suffered damage in the form of a less efficient
movie screen due to the intrusion of light rays from the defendaiht's
neighboring race track. The court, in holding that trespass would not
lie for such an invasion stated that "The mere suggestion that the
casting of light upon the premises of a plaintiff would render a
defendant liable without proof of any actual damage, carries its own
refutation."' 5 The court in Martin chose to distinguish the Amphi-
theaters case by ignoring its express holding and interpreting it to
mean that the defendant simply had not violated a legally protected
interest of the plaintiff, not that the invasion of light or other intangi-
ble forces can never constitute a trespass.6 Thus the case was limited
to its own facts. The Martin case indicates that since the de minimis
principle is applicable, there would be no recovery where the defen-
dant cast the light from a candle beam upon the screen of the theatre
since "the defendant's conduct is not substantial enough to be re-
garded as a trespassory intrusion" 67 or alternatively, that the plain-
tiff has no legally protectible interest, that is, one has no absolute right
to be free from such minimal annoyances. However, had the intrusion
been the intense glare of floodlights, then the court would have invoked
the balancing process so familiar to the law of nuisance since the
entry is no longer de minimis. Although plaintiff would have a legally
protectible interest, the "invasion" might not constitute an actionable
trespass if, upon the balancing of the equities, the court found that
the use of the lights had a degree of social utility which outweighed
the plaintiff's interest. Thus, not every technically sufficient entry
would be actionable. The determination would be made "in view of the
nature of plaintiff's use and the manner in which the defendant inter-
ferred with it."88
64. 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
65. Id. at 343, 198 P.2d at 850.
66. 342 P.2d at 794. "In denying recovery the court [Amphitheaters] found
that there was no damage, apparently because whatever harm the plaintiff
suffered was damnum absque injuria."
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
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The view of the Martin case is less a wholesale departure from the
traditional application of trespass law than might on first view
appear, since even the absolute trespass has, on occasion, involved a
certain amount of weighing by the courts. With the advent of air
travel, the courts were anxious to relieve aviators from the strict lia-
bility which would result from a mere flight over another's land, since
the traditional view employed the Roman law maxim, cuJus est solum
ejus esque ad coelum, which gave the surface occupant a right to ex-
clusive possession upward ad infinitum.4 ' Thus the courts adjusted
trespass theory to meet the needs of a changing society by narrowing
the area in which a trespass could be committed. Today, one in posses-
sion of land is protected only from such invasions as impair his present
use of the property.70 Harm is made the test of the surface occupant's
rights. The Restatement of Torts, on the other hand, retained the
ad coelum doctrine, maintaining, however, that although flight over
another's land is a technical trespass, it is privileged by law.'
Such conceptual manipulation would not have been necessary had a
doctrine similar to the Martin decision been followed: The court there
would say that although an airplane flying at a substantial height
satisfies the "force and energy" requirement for a trespassory entry,
the possesor's interest in exclusive possession, upon a weighing of the
equities, would be found wanting.7 2 On the other hand, the possessor
would have a protectible interest in not being "buzzed" by inconsider-
ate pilots since such an interference would not be de minimis.72
Statutes of Limitation
A significant problem would arise under the redefinition of tres-
pass with reference to statutes of limitation.7' It is generally held
that a cause of action in trespass becomes complete when the land is
69. For an enlightening discussion of this problem, see Sweeney, Adjusting the
Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J.
Air L. 329 (1932); Note, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 499 (1937).
70. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp.
469 (Sup. Ct. 1933). See Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
71. Restatement, Torts § 194 (1939). The Restatement position is defended in
Thurston, Trespass to Air Space, Harvard Legal Essays 501 (1934).
72. See note 59 supra.
73. See note 60 supra.
74. A secondary problem in this area concerns the intention to be imputed to
the legislature in establishing longer periods of limitation for trespassory in-
vasions than for non-trespassory invasions. If it is intended that trespass and
nuisance be defined in terms of the definitions in use in the courts at the time the
applicable statute became effective, then the common law has become immutable.
However, it would seem to be more reasonable to interpret this as an indication
by the legislature that they are intended the statutes to apply to trespass or to
nuisance, as the actions are or may lecome defined by the courts.
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entered,75 whereas the statute does not begin to run on nuisance until
the interference causes substantial harm, 6 regardless of the time
when the cause of the injury came into existence. Thus, if entry of
particulates may constitute a trespass, and if the conventional rule as
to the accrual of the cause of action in trespass is followed, it would
be impossible in many situations to determine just when the land was
first entered, and therefore, when the statute should begin to run. But
if, as under the Martin case, the trespass is not actionable until the
right to exclusive possession has been invaded, and the invasion, by
logic of the de minimis rule, is in turn dependent upon a showing of
damage, then the statute should run from the time when it is possible
to show that the invasion of the particulates had, in some way, dam-
aged the plaintiff. This is, in effect, an adoption of the nuisance rule
as to the time when a cause of action shall accrue.
V. CONCLUSION
Although a redefinition of trespass as proposed by the court in
the Martin decision would do violence to long established principles
of the law of trespass, it is clear that the extent of liability attendant
upon the operation of industrial activities would not be significantly
increased, since the use of the balancing process and the de minimis
concept would effectively prevent unjustified actions. Thus, giving an
injured landowner a right of action in trespass for the entry of in-
visible particles would result in no net gain for him, since a weighing
of the interests would not permit recovery in trespass any more
readily than the same interference would have been remediable in a
nuisance action.
The net effect of any such redefinition would be a clarification of the
entry requirement in trespass: if there has been an invasion by a
measurable force, the entry requirement for trespass is satisfied. Thus
the artificial and arbitrary "visible object" rule would be repudiated.
The major substantive change would be the abolition of the absolute
rights afforded to possessors of land to be free from any invasion of
their possessory interests. Their right to recover nominal damages
for a purely technical trespass would be at an end. However, with the
exception of disputes over boundaries and prescriptive rights, suits
for purely technical trespass are quite rare anyway due to court costs
and attorneys' fees. Further, there seems to be little justification for
the continuation of such absolute rights for landowners in the Twen-
tieth Century, where persons live in such close proximity to each other
and inoffensive entries onto another's property have become accepted
and commonplace.
75. Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Mihlman, 17 Kan. 224 (1876); National Copper Co. v.
Minnesota Mining Co., 57 Mich. 83, 23 N.W. 781 (1885).
76. Heckaman v. Northern Pac. Ry., 93 Mont. 363, 20 P.2d 258 (1933).
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